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Looking ahead: Anticipatory cueing of attention to
objects others will look at
Katherine Joyce1, Kimberley Schenke1, Andrew Bayliss2, and Patric Bach1
1School of Psychology, Plymouth University, Plymouth, UK
2School of Psychology, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK
Seeing a face gaze at an object elicits rapid attention shifts toward the same object. We tested whether gaze cueing
is predictive: do people shift their attention toward objects others are merely expected to look at? Participants
categorized objects while a face either looked at this object, at another object, or straight ahead. Unbeknownst to
participants, one face would only look at drinks and the other at foods. We tested whether attention was drawn
toward objects “favored” by a face even when currently looking straight ahead. Indeed, while gaze expectations
initially had a disruptive effect, participants did shift attention to the faces’ favored objects once learning had been
established, as long as emotional expressions had indicated personal relevance of the object to the individual.
These data support predictive models of social perception, which assume that predictions can drive perception and
action, as if these stimuli were directly perceived.
Keywords: Gaze cueing; Joint attention; Predictive coding; Prediction; attention.
Humans routinely track what other people know,
want, and feel, for a large number of individuals,
without being explicitly aware of it (e.g., Schneider,
Bayliss, Becker, & Dux, 2012). A key process in this
ability is the human tendency to follow others’ gaze.
Seeing a face look at an object causes a rapid,
spontaneous shift of spatial attention in the observer
toward the same target (Driver et al., 1999; see
Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007; for review). By
synchronizing attention across interaction partners,
this “gaze cueing” effect may underpin, at least in
part, mankind’s remarkable ability for social learning,
cooperation, and communication. Conversely,
disruptions of this process may underlie some of the
social difﬁculties in autism spectrum and related
conditions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995).
The present study tests whether gaze cueing is
predictive. Do we just follow the overt gaze of other
people, or do we also routinely shift our attention
toward what we expect other people will look at?
Everyday behavior is ripe with such anticipatory
attention shifts, where people’s attention is guided
by the relevance an object has, not to themselves,
but to their interaction partners. Parents report that
their attention is often drawn to objects (diggers,
tractors, princesses, and sweets) that their children
would like. People helpfully point out objects others
are looking for, and, when shopping, they have a
knack of ﬁnding items that their friends would like.
Such predictive gaze-cueing effects emerge
naturally from recent hierarchical feedback models
of perception (Clark, 2013; Friston & Kiebel, 2009;
Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007). In such models,
perception is not only driven by bottom-up sensory
information, but is directly informed by prior
knowledge about forthcoming events. In many
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cases, these predictions can “stand in” for what is
actually observed, and induce perceptual biases. For
example, people misperceive the disappearance point
of a moving object further along the trajectory than it
really is (Freyd & Finke, 1984). These predictions of
future motion are guided by one’s assumptions about
the external forces acting on the object (cf. Hubbard,
2005) and are integrated, in a Bayesian manner, with
actual stimulation (e.g., Roach, McGraw, & Johnston,
2011). In the social domain, it has been shown that
heads appear to be rotated further if their gaze
suggests a looking goal in this direction (Hudson,
Hong-Liu, & Jellema, 2009). Hands are perceived
closer to an object when the observer anticipates a
reach and further away if they anticipate a withdrawal
(Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, & Bach, under review-a,
under review-b), and observers more speedily identify
actions an individual typically carries out with an
object, compared to actions that are equally likely
but typical for someone else (Schenke, Wyer, &
Bach, under review).
These ﬁndings provide initial evidence that
people constantly predict others’ future behavior
and that these predictions can, to some extent,
stand in for sensory information, as if these stimuli
were directly perceived. Here, we test, for the ﬁrst
time, whether observers make such predictions
about others’ gaze, and whether these gaze
predictions lead to similar attentional shifts as
directly perceived gaze. Prior research has
provided suggestive evidence for this idea. For
example, gaze cueing can be elicited not only by
directly perceived gaze but merely by the belief that
a person looks at an object (Teufel, Alexis, Clayton,
& Davis, 2010). Moreover, Frischen and Tipper
(2006) have reported that, when re-encountering a
face one has seen before, attention is guided not
only by the face’s current gaze, but by its gaze in
the previous encounter. Frischen and Tipper
interpreted this as a recall of the observer’s own
prior attentional state, but it might also reﬂect an
anticipatory coding of gaze (cf. Bayliss & Tipper,
2006). The person in the photograph had been
looking left so we predict the photograph to show
the same gaze when seen again.
To test whether gaze expectations can induce
such anticipatory gaze cueing, we adapted the
standard gaze-cueing paradigm. In each trial,
participants saw one of two faces in the middle
of two objects. A target appeared on one of the
objects and participants indicated, in a speeded
response, whether the object was a food or a
drink. In half the trials, the face would gaze—and
smile—at one of the two objects just prior to the
cue. Participants were instructed to ignore these
gaze shifts, and we manipulated, unbeknownst to
participants, which objects the two faces would
look at. One face would only look and smile at
drinks, and the other at foods. According to prior
work, these gaze shifts should involuntarily direct
attention to the gazed-at object, rendering it easier
to identify.
The key question is whether people form gaze
expectations about the two individuals, such that
attention would shift toward their favored object,
even when the individuals looked straight ahead.
Participants should then more quickly identify
objects the face would typically gaze at,
compared with objects it typically looks away
from, speciﬁcally in the second half of the
experiment, when participants have learned the
relationships between faces and objects. Such an
effect could not be explained by a mere
reactivation of the observer’s prior attentional
state. Overall, both faces equally often looked left
and right, and their favored objects were seen
equally often in both locations. Finding gaze-
cueing effects toward the faces’ favored objects
would therefore reveal an anticipatory cueing of




Sixty-two students from Plymouth University (18–
52 years, 14 male) took part. Sample size was
determined by a power analysis conducted on
pilot data (see Supplementary material). For half
of the participants the presented faces were
cartoon faces and for the other half the presented
faces were real face photographs. Cartoon faces
are typically more effective in evoking gaze
shifts, most likely because their visual simplicity
facilitates cue extraction (e.g., Hietanen &
Leppänen, 2003) and are therefore the most
powerful test of the experimental hypothesis.
Face photographs, in contrast, allow us to test
whether any effects generalize to more realistic
face representations that more plausibly represent
different individuals. Two participants, one from
each group, were excluded because they made
more than 10% errors. The study was approved
by the ethics committee of Plymouth University,
and adhered to the ethical guidelines of the ESRC,
in accord with the declaration of Helsinki.



























All participants completed the Autism Quotient (AQ;
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, &
Clubley, 2001). The experiment proper was
administered via Presentation software, on a Windows
XP SP3 1280 × 1024 32-bit color 17” display. Stimuli
were assembled from 25 images: a ﬁxation cross (the
“+” symbol in Microsoft’s Trebuchet font), four color
photographs each of foods (orange, cupcake, apple, and
hotdog) and drinks (cola can, orange juice, milkshake,
and coffee) and cartoon and photograph versions of a
male and a female face. The cartoon faces were
generated with MS PowerPoint and the face
photographs were taken from the Radboud Face
Database (Langner, Dotsch, Bijlstra, Wigboldus,
Hawk, & Van Knippenberg, 2010). The faces could
either look straight ahead with a neutral expression,
blink (eyes closed) with a neutral expression, or smile
while looking left or right (Figure 1).
Design and procedure
The participants were seated roughly 60 cm away from
the monitor. They ﬁlled out the Autism Quotient, were
given verbal and on-screen instructions, and then
completed 16 practice trials. The experiment proper
consisted of 256 trials. Participants were allowed to
press “p” at any point to take a break.
Each trial started with a ﬁxation cross (400 ms).
After a brief blank (600 ms), one of two faces
appeared in the middle of the screen, with a food
item and a drink on either side (locations
counterbalanced across trials). The face looked
straight ahead with a neutral expression for a
random time interval between 500 and 1100 ms and
then blinked for 100 ms. The next image showed the
face with eyes open, in 50% of the trials looking
straight ahead with a neutral expression, or smiling
and looking at one of the objects in the other 50% of
the trails. One face would always look at the drinks
and never at foods, while the other face showed the
opposite behavior (counterbalanced between
participants). After 400 ms, a blue square appeared
on one object and participants categorized this object
as either a drink or a food by pressing either “h” or
the space bar. This image was presented until
participants made a response or a maximum trial
time of four seconds had passed. Feedback was
given for error and timeouts reminding participants
of the key assignment.
Figure 1. Schematic of the trial sequence. After a ﬁxation cross
(400 ms) and a blank screen (600 ms), participants saw either a
male or female face ﬂanked by a drink and a food item. After a
random time interval (between 500 and 1100 ms), the face blinked
(for 100 ms). When the eyes opened again, the face either looked
straight ahead (not shown) or at one of the two objects, and a blue
square marking the object to be categorized appeared 400 ms later.
We manipulated the gaze behavior of the two faces such that, if
looking sideways, one face would only look at drinks and the other
only at food (counterbalanced between participants).


























After the experiment, participants were asked
whether they noticed a pattern in the stimuli; none
did, and several expressed surprise when the
manipulation was revealed.
RESULTS
As during piloting (Supplementary material), trials
(1.7% in total) were excluded if they contained:
responses before or after the response interval,
responses with uncertain presentation timing (>
10 ms), or responses with RTs (response times) ±3
standard deviations from the participant’s mean in the
straight or sideways gaze trials. As participants
initiated pauses themselves, trials following or
preceding pauses were also excluded. Participants
with AQ scores in the clinical range (> 32) would
have been excluded, though none were excluded.
Data were analyzed separately for the gaze-toward
object and gaze-straight trials. The gaze trials tested
whether our paradigm evoked the expected gaze-
cueing effects, but do not say anything about gaze
expectancies, as the faces looked at their favored
object in all of these trials. In contrast, the trials
with straight gaze measured gaze expectancies, and
whether attention was directed toward the favored
object even when the face looked straight ahead.
Regular gaze cueing
We ﬁrst conﬁrmed that our paradigm elicited the
typical gaze-cueing effects. We analyzed the gaze-
toward object trials with a 2 X 2 mixed-factors
ANOVA with Object (looked at, not looked at) and
Block (1, 2) as repeated measures factors and Group
(cartoon faces, photographs) as the between-subjects
factor. The analysis of RTs (Table 1) only revealed a
main effect of Object F(1, 58) = 90.8, MSE = 1563;
p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.610, but no other effects (Fs < 1).
Participants more quickly categorized a looked-at
object than a not looked-at object, in both Block 1,
F(1, 58) = 54.7; MSE = 1248; p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.486)
and Block 2, F(1, 58) = 58.6; MSE = 1259; p < .001,
ηp
2 = 0.502). The analogous analysis of error rates
(Table 1) revealed no effects (Fs < 1) except for an
interaction of Object by Group, F(1, 58) = 13.3;
p < .001, MSE = 0.019; ηp
2 = 0.19. For cartoon
faces, participants made more errors for not looked-
at-objects and for photographs they made more errors
for looked-at objects (Table 1).
Anticipatory gaze cueing
The crucial test was whether observers would also
shift their attention to the expected object when the
face looked straight ahead. RTs and Error rates in the
straight-gaze trials were analyzed with the same
ANOVA as the regular-gaze trials, with the Object
factor now coding whether the target appeared on the
object the face typically looked at, or the other object.
The analysis of RTs (Figure 2, left panels) revealed
neither an effect of Object, F < 1, nor of Block, F
(1, 58) = 3.5, MSE = 2052, p = .066, ηp
2 = 0.057, but
a signiﬁcant interaction between both factors, F
(1, 58) = 12.116, MSE = 761, p = .001, ηp
2 = 0.173.
Step down ANOVAs revealed that, in Block 1,
participants were faster to categorize typically
looked away from objects compared to typically
looked-at objects, F(1, 58) = 6.2, MSE = 822,
p = .015, ηp
2 = 0.097, while Block 2 revealed the
expected pattern of faster responses for objects the
person typically looks at, F(1, 58) = 4.9, MSE = 834,
p = .031, ηp
2 = 0.078. Group did not interact with any
factor (Fs < 1). The Object by Block interaction was
replicated in the photograph group, F(1, 29) = 4.6,
MSE = 874, p = .040, ηp
2 = 0.138, and the cartoon
group F(1, 29) = 8.0, MSE = 647, p = .008,
ηp
2 = 0.217, when analyzed separately (Figure 2).
The analysis of error rates (Figure 2, right panels)
revealed a signiﬁcant effect of Block F(1, 58) = 6.7,
MSE = 0.001, p = .012, ηp
2 = 0.104, with fewer errors
in the second half of the experiment. Importantly,
there was a signiﬁcant effect of Object, F
(1, 58) = 4.7, MSE = 0.001, p = .034, ηp
2 = 0.075,
but no interaction, F < 1. Step-down ANOVAs
revealed that participants made fewer errors for
typically gazed-at objects in Block 2, F
(1, 58) = 4.863, MSE = 0.001, p = .031,
ηp
2 = 0.077, but not in Block 1, F(1, 58) = 1.065,
MSE = 0.001, p = .306, ηp
2 = 0.18. Group did not
interact with any other factor (Fs < 2.7).
A separate study (see Supplementary material) tested
whether the same effects were also obtained when the
observed faces did not smile but showed a neutral
TABLE 1
Regular gaze-cueing effects for both response times and error
rates. Values in brackets show the standard deviation in the
condition
Response times (ms) Error rates (%)
Group looked at not looked at looked at not looked at
Cartoons 509 (83) 562 (89) 3.3 (2.9) 5.2 (3.6)
Photographs 544 (116) 587 (114) 4.4 (3.8) 2.8 (2.5)


























expression when looking at the objects, but was
otherwise identical. While this study replicated the
regular gaze-cueing effects, with faster responses for
looked-at compared to not looked-at objects, all
predictive gaze-cueing effects in both RTs and Error
Rates were eliminated, all Fs < 1.1. Indeed, across-
experiment comparisons revealed that the predictive
gaze-cueing effects in the main experiment differed
signiﬁcantly from this control experiment, both for the
RT interaction, F(1, 118) = 10.5, MSE = 722, p < .002,
ηp
2 = 0.082, and the error rate effect in Block 2, F
(1, 118) = 4.150, MSE = 0.004, p < .044, ηp
2 = 0.034.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We tested whether gaze cueing of attention is driven
only by bottom-up gaze cues, or whether it is
predictive, and is guided by the gaze a person is only
expected to show. Participants categorized objects
while a face either looked at this object, at another
object, or straight ahead. Unbeknownst to
participants, we manipulated the looking behavior of
the faces, such that one face (e.g., the male) would only
look at foods and the other (e.g., the female) would
only look at drinks. We tested whether participants
would derive implicit gaze expectations from these
contingencies, and whether these expectations would
elicit similar shifts of attention even when the faces
looked straight ahead.
As predicted, the second half of the experiment, after
participants had learned the individuals’ looking
behaviors, revealed such anticipatory cueing effects.
Participants categorized objects more quickly and
reliably if these objects were typically looked and
smiled at by the individual, compared to the objects
that they typically looked away from. These
anticipatory shifts of attention were observed even
though (1) neither the face nor gaze direction was task
relevant; (2) gaze direction did not predict the location
of the task-relevant object; and (3) across faces, all
objects were looked at equally often. The data
therefore indicate that, by Block 2, observers had
implicitly formed internal models of the individuals’
gaze behavior, which then directed attention toward
the expected object, as if the gaze shift were directly
observed. Gaze cueing of attention is therefore not only
driven by bottom-up sensory information, but also by
expectations about others’ gaze, supporting the
assumption that predicted stimulation can drive action
and cognition, as if the event was directly observed (cf.
Clark, 2013; Friston & Kiebel, 2009).
We had expected that these effects would slowly
build up, and that anticipatory gaze cueing was small
or absent in the ﬁrst half of the experiment. However,
an unexpected pattern emerged in these earlier trials.
Participants were slower to identify objects that the
other person typically looked at, compared to objects
they typically looked away from. The shift from
negative to positive gaze-cueing effects over the
Figure 2. Response times (left panels) and error rates (right panels) in the straight-gaze trials, for the cartoon faces (top row) and real faces
(bottom rows) groups separately. In each ﬁgure, the left two bars show the data for the ﬁrst half of the experiment, and the right two bars show
the data for the second half of the experiment. The black bars show categorization response for objects that are typically looked at by the shown
individual, and the white bars show objects that this individual typically looks away form. Error bars show the standard error of the mean.


























experiment was replicated in both the face photograph
and cartoon faces groups. It suggests that participants
learn about the predictive relationships between
individuals, objects, and gaze very quickly. At the
start, these predictions have a disruptive effect. Only
when fully established do they guide attention
similarly as directly observed gaze.
Although not predicted, such negative effects are in
line with hierarchical feedback models of perception.
These models conceptualize perception as an
integration of sensory information and top-down
predictions, such that predictions can “stand in” for
what was actually perceived (Clark, 2013; Friston &
Kiebel, 2009). These assimilative effects of prior
information are, however, typically only observed
when the stimuli are not directly attended (Kok,
Rahnev, Jehee, Lau, & de Lange, 2011). Attended
stimuli may cause reverse effects and bias perception
away from the predictions. Classic examples are visual
after-images, where observing—or even imagining—a
movement to the left causes subsequent static images
to be perceived as moving subtly to the right (Wade,
Thompson, & Morgan, 2014), and we have observed
similar contrastive effects in motor activation when
famous athletes were seen not performing their
typical sports (Bach & Tipper, 2006; Tipper & Bach,
2011). In the same way, here, the negative cueing
effects might emerge because the individual’s straight
gaze is coded relative to the expected looking behavior,
causing a bias in the opposite direction. When,
however, participants become more effective at
diverting attention away from the distracting faces
over the course of the experiment, these effects revert
to positive ones, revealing the expected superposition
of sensory information and prior expectations. Of
course, at the moment, these considerations are
speculative and need to be further veriﬁed.
An interesting observation was that the predictive
gaze-cueing effects depended on the faces showing an
emotional response when looking at the objects (see
also Bayliss, Grifﬁths, & Tipper, 2009; Bayliss,
Schuch, & Tipper, 2010). In a separate experiment
(Supplementary material)—initially used for piloting,
but increased to full sample size at the request of a
reviewer—we ran exactly the same procedure, but
with the faces showing a neutral expression when
looking at their objects. While the regular gaze-cueing
effects were identical across experiments, all predictive
gaze-cueing effects were now eliminated. This
difference is striking given that predictive coding
models do not necessarily distinguish between social
and other effects on perception. This dependency on
an emotional expression reveals a social coding of the
individuals’ gaze, reﬂecting, perhaps, the mental states
that the emotional expressions imply, or the emotional
relevance the object has to the individuals (cf. Manera,
Elena, Bayliss, & Becchio, 2014; Bach, Nicholson, &
Hudson, 2014). It is in line with the idea that internal
models of other people do not only reﬂect their
behaviors toward objects, but also the internal states
these behaviors imply (Barresi & Moore, 1996). Our
new data therefore provide the ﬁrst evidence for models
suggesting that such top-down knowledge can be
converted into concrete predictions of others’ gaze that
drives one’s own attention system as if the gaze shifts
were directly observed, as predicted by predictive
coding of social perception (e.g., Kilner, Friston, &
Frith, 2007).
An important question is whether the predictive
effects on gaze cueing reﬂect explicit or implicit
learning of the contingencies. This question was not
central to the current hypotheses, but in a post-
experiment screening none of the participants
reported awareness of the patterns. This unawareness
probably emerged because the faces of the individuals
were task irrelevant and there was no relationship
between gazed-at-object and object-to-be-categorized.
Indeed, many participants stated that they attempted to
ignore the faces altogether. Moreover, in a prior study,
we showed that participants often remain unaware of
similar relationships between individuals, situations,
and behaviors (Schenke et al., under review), even
when alerted, several times during the experiment,
that such a pattern was present. Together with the
reports of our participants, these data indicate that the
typical behavior of others is learned in a largely
implicit manner, but nevertheless directly affects
perception and guidance of attention.
CONCLUSIONS
Gaze cueing of attention is not only driven by
bottom-up sensory information, but also by prior
expectations about what other individuals will look
at in a given situation. Because gaze cueing is central
for joint attention, learning from others and ﬂuent
social interaction, such a predictive mechanism
could have far-reaching impacts on social
interaction, allowing people to attend to what others
will look at in the future, or direct their attention to
objects that are relevant to their interaction partners.
Future experiments need to explore the role of the
implicit/explicit nature of the predictions, and why, in


























the ﬁrst half of the experiment, predictions can give
rise to paradoxical negative gaze-cueing effects.
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